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Conflicts of Interest in Medicine, Research, 
and Law:  A Comparison 
Stacey A. Tovino, JD, PhD* 
Abstract 
 
Several of the remarks and articles presented in this symposium 
have addressed conflicts of interest arising during the provision of legal 
counsel to individuals who are elderly, including specific conflicts of 
interest implicated by estate planning, retirement planning, and long-term 
care planning.  Topics examined thus far include conflicts of interest 
with respect to the application of rules of confidentiality within state 
rules of professional conduct to elderly clients with impaired decision-
making capacity; conflicts of interest involving representative payees for 
Social Security benefits; conflicts of interest in distributions when 
parents enter into marriages that are unprotected by law; and conflicts of 
interest inherent in powers of attorney, among others.
1
 
This article will diverge slightly from the prior articles and focus 
instead on conflicts of interest present in the involvement of individuals 
who are elderly with impaired decision-making capacity in clinical and 
experimental medicine when legal counsel and advanced health care and 
research participation planning have not taken place.  More specifically, 
Parts I and II of this article will identify conflicts of interest that arise in 
the contexts of clinical medicine and human subjects research when an 
elderly patient with impaired decision-making capacity has not executed 
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 1.  See Katherine C. Pearson, Introduction to Symposium Issue, Capacity, Conflict, 
and Change: Elder Law and Estate Planning Themes in an Aging World, 117 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 979 (2013) (highlighting the issues presented in this symposium edition). 
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an advanced health care directive, an advanced biomedical or behavioral 
research directive, or other similar document, and for whom a guardian 
has not been appointed.  Parts I and II also compare and contrast 
illustrative state approaches for identifying and managing these conflicts 
to determine whether one state’s approach to managing such conflicts is 
preferable to another. 
Part III of this article compares and contrasts approaches taken by 
illustrative state rules of professional conduct for managing conflicts of 
interest in the context of legal representation.  Part IV compares the 
approaches used in legal representation to the approaches used in clinical 
medicine and human subjects research.  One purpose of these 
comparisons is to identify options for managing conflicts in different 
professional settings and to determine whether the approach of one 
professional setting is superior to another.  Part IV finds that the law 
imposes more stringent duties on attorneys regarding the identification 
and management of conflicts of interest with respect to their clients as 
opposed to physicians with respect to their patients and researchers with 
respect to their human subjects.  Part IV also finds that the conflicts of 
interest that can arise due to the lack of advanced health care and 
research participation planning are as substantively concerning, if not 
more so, than the conflicts of interest that arise during the provision of 
estate planning, retirement planning, and long-term care planning. 
For these reasons, this article joins the already robust law review 
and other literatures that urge advanced health care and advanced 
research participation planning to minimize conflicts of interest that 
could arise when a surrogate, in the absence of a formally appointed 
agent or guardian, would like to consent to the administration, 
withholding, or withdrawal of treatment or consent to research 
participation on behalf of an elderly individual with impaired decision-
making capacity.  As such, this article hopefully serves as a nice 
capstone to the other pieces in this symposium by providing yet another 
reminder that legal planning, even with the conflicts of interest identified 
by the other authors in this symposium, is almost always superior to the 
lack of planning.  This article also, however, proposes a novel solution 
for health care and research-related conflicts:  state laws governing 
conflicts of interest in clinical medicine and human subject research 
should consider borrowing approaches to conflicts management that are 
set forth in state rules of attorney professional conduct. 
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I. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL MEDICINE 
The involvement of individuals who are elderly and have impaired 
decision-making capacity in clinical medicine can create conflicts of 
interest that require identification and proper management.
2
 As 
background, in the context of clinical medicine, decision-making 
capacity refers to an elderly patient’s cognitive and emotional capacity to 
consider information relating to the risks and benefits of a proposed 
diagnostic examination, medical treatment, or surgical procedure; the 
ability to make a decision to consent or refuse to consent to such 
examination, treatment, or procedure; and the ability to communicate 
that decision.
3
  Neurologists, psychiatrists, geriatricians, and emergency 
 
 2. The introductory material in text accompanying notes 1-8 is taken with 
permission and with only technical changes from Stacey Tovino, A ‘Common’ Proposal, 
50 HOUS. L. REV. 787, Part I (2013). 
 3. See, e.g., Gregory L. Larkin et al., Emergency Determination of Decision-
Making Capacity: Balancing Autonomy and Beneficence in the Emergency Department, 
8 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 282, 282 (2001) (“Decision-making capacity includes the 
ability to receive, process, and understand information, the ability to deliberate, the 
ability to make choices, and the ability to communicate those preferences.”); Roy C. 
Martin et al., Medical Decision-Making Capacity in Cognitively Impaired Parkinson’s 
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medicine physicians, among other clinicians, frequently treat elderly 
patients with impaired decision-making capacity.
4
  Some of these 
patients may be in a coma or vegetative state and have no present 
decision-making capacity.
5
  Other elderly patients may have mild, 
moderate, or severe neurological disorders, including Parkinson’s 
disease, Alzheimer’s disease, and related dementias that may restrict 
their decision-making capacity.
6
  Still other elderly patients may have 
severe mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia with disturbance of 
thought and perception, which limit their decision-making capacity.
7
  As 
 
Disease Patients Without Dementia, 23 MOVEMENT DISORDERS 1867, 1867-68 (2008) 
(defining medical decision-making capacity as the cognitive and emotional capacity to 
accept a proposed treatment, to refuse treatment, or to select among treatment 
alternatives). 
 4. See, e.g., Edmund Howe, Ethical Aspects of Evaluating a Patient’s Mental 
Capacity, 6 PSYCHIATRY 15, 15 (2009) (noting that non-psychiatrist physicians frequently 
consult with psychiatrists to help make determinations regarding patients’ decision-
making capacity); James M. Lai & Jason Karlawish, Assessing the Capacity to Make 
Everyday Decisions: A Guide for Clinicians and an Agenda for Future Research, 15 AM. 
J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 101, 101 (2007) (noting that competency assessments are a 
common and necessary part of caring for older patients with cognitive impairments and 
that geriatricians face considerable challenges in accurately and reliably identifying 
impaired competency); id. at 103 (explaining that discharge planners, case managers, and 
clinicians in hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, and emergency departments frequently 
must decide whether patients with functional impairments are capable of making 
decisions).  See generally Grant V. Chow et al., CURVES: A Mnemonic for Determining 
Medical Decision-Making Capacity and Providing Emergency Treatment in the Acute 
Setting, 137 CHEST 421, 421-27 (2010) (addressing the evaluation of decision-making 
capacity in the emergency context). 
 5. See, e.g., Rowan H. Harwood, Robert Stewart & Peter Bartlett, Safeguarding the 
Rights of Patients Who Lack Capacity in General Hospitals, 36 AGE & AGEING 120, 120 
(2007) (“Many people . . . in coma are admitted to hospital, but lack the capacity to 
consent to admission.”); Sheila A. M. McLean, Permanent Vegetative State and the Law, 
71 J. NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY i26, i26-i27 (2001) (noting that 
patients in a vegetative state lack capacity to consent to treatment). 
 6. See, e.g., Jason Karlawish, Measuring Decision-Making Capacity in Cognitively 
Impaired Individuals, 16 NEUROSIGNALS 91, 91-98 (2008) (reviewing studies of the 
capacity to consent to treatment and research in the context of Alzheimer’s disease and 
related dementias; noting that individuals with Alzheimer’s disease and related dementias 
frequently experience losses in decision-making capacity); Martin et al., supra note 3, at 
1867-74 (assessing decision-making capacity in patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD) 
compared to healthy older adults and suggesting that impairment in decision-making 
capacity is already present in cognitively impaired PD patients without dementia, and that 
such impairment increases as these patients develop dementia); Jennifer Moye et al., 
Neuropsychological Predictors of Decision-Making Capacity Over 9 Months in Mild-to-
Moderate Dementia, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 78, 78-83 (2006) (examining rates and 
neuropsychological predictors of decision-making capacity among older adults with 
dementia; finding that some patients with mild-to-moderate dementia develop clinically 
relevant impairments of decision-making capacity within a year). 
 7. See, e.g., Delphine Capdevielle et al., Competence to Consent and Insight in 
Schizophrenia: Is There an Association? A Pilot Study, 108 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 272, 
272-73 (2009) (“Data from studies of treatment decision processes by schizophrenic 
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these examples show, an elderly individual’s decision-making capacity is 
not always conclusively present or absent, but occurs along a continuum 
that depends on the nature and severity of the patient’s physical and 
mental health conditions and the timing of the patient’s symptom 
occurrence.
8
  Neurological, psychiatric, and other health conditions do 
not invariably impair an elderly individual’s decision-making capacity, 
and patient-specific assessments are always necessary.
9
 
If an elderly individual does not have impaired decision-making 
capacity, the elderly individual can receive information regarding a 
proposed diagnostic examination, medical treatment, or surgical 
procedure and make an informed decision regarding whether to consent 
to that procedure.  Assuming (for the moment) that the health care 
provider does not have an interest, such as a financial stake, in the 
proposed treatment that would result in the recommendation or 
performance of a treatment that is not in the patient’s best interests,10 
 
patients have suggested that, as a group, these patients perform significantly worse on 
many measures in comparison to those suffering from depression, other medical illnesses 
(such as heart disease, HIV infection) or healthy control subjects.”); John H. Coverdale, 
Laurence B. McCullough & Frank A. Chervenak, Assisted and Surrogate Decision 
Making for Pregnant Patients Who Have Schizophrenia, 30 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 659, 
659 (2004) (explaining that “[s]chizophrenia can chronically and variably impair a 
woman’s decisions concerning the management of her pregnancy,” including decisions 
regarding pregnancy continuation). 
 8. Joseph E. Beltran, Shared Decision Making: The Ethics of Caring and Best 
Respect, 12 BIOETHICS F. 17, 17 (1996) (noting that decision-making capacity for 
individuals with disabilities occurs along a continuum); Larkin et al., supra note 3, at 
282.  Larkin et al. state: 
[Decision-making capacity] is a dynamic . . . and changing talent; in practice it 
may be assessed on a non-dichotomous spectrum of capacity, pertaining to the 
particular health care decisions at hand.  Often, impairment is situational; the 
same patient may be competent for one decision and not another, depending on 
the gravity and consequences of the decision and the potential for harm. 
Id. 
 9. See, e.g., THE MACARTHUR RESEARCH NETWORK ON MENTAL HEALTH & THE 
LAW, THE MACARTHUR TREATMENT COMPETENCE STUDY (2004), available at 
http://bit.ly/laRQnc.  The study notes: 
Most patients hospitalized with serious mental illness have abilities similar to 
persons without mental illness for making treatment decisions.  Taken by itself, 
mental illness does not invariably impair decision making capacities.  On the 
other hand, a substantial percentage of hospitalized patients—up to half in the 
group with schizophrenia when all four types of abilities are considered—show 
high levels of impairment. 
Id. 
 10. Certainly, this assumption does not always hold.  Any physician who receives 
payment directly from a patient or indirectly through insurance for performing a 
procedure on a patient has a financial interest in the performance of that procedure.  If the 
procedure is not in the patient’s best health interests, then a conflict of interest exists.  
Many physicians also use, prescribe, or recommend health care items and services 
provided, manufactured, or otherwise made available by companies with which the 
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conflicts of interest are not front and center in the treatment of elderly 
individuals with intact decision-making capacity. 
On the other hand, if an elderly individual does have impaired 
decision-making capacity, the elderly individual may not be able to 
comprehend information regarding a proposed examination, treatment, or 
procedure, or make an informed decision whether to consent to such 
examination, treatment, or procedure.  In this case, if the elderly 
individual did not execute an advanced health care planning document 
when competent, such as a directive to physician (also called a living 
will)
11
 or a medical power of attorney (also called a health care power of 
attorney),
12
 governing law typically allows—as a default—certain classes 
of persons to provide what is known as “surrogate” consent to treatment 
on behalf of the individual.
13
 
The problem, of course, is that the surrogate decision maker may 
have interests that conflict with the interests that the elderly individual 
would or could identify if competent.  For example, the surrogate may 
stand to inherit money or property upon the death of the elderly 
individual and, therefore, may wish to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining treatment from the individual even though the individual, 
while competent, may have desired to have been maintained for as long 
as possible in the event of a medical cure or for another reason.  In this 
case, the surrogate’s interests would conflict with those of the elderly 
 
physician has a financial relationship, such as an ownership interest or compensation 
arrangement.  If even one reason the physician uses, prescribes, or recommends the item 
or service is for compensation or other financial reward, a conflict of interest exists.  
These are just two examples of conflicts of interest that are present in everyday clinical 
medicine involving patients with intact decision-making capacity.  In order to focus on 
the conflicts of interest that exist in clinical medicine involving elderly patients with 
impaired decision-making capacity and for whom no planning has taken place, this article 
recognizes, but must set aside, these basic conflicts. 
 11. Under many state laws, a directive to physician, sometimes called a living will, 
is a document that contains a directive from a patient to a physician declaring the types of 
treatments that will be administered, withheld, or withdrawn from the patient in the event 
the patient has a terminal or an irreversible condition.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 36-3261–36-3262 (1992) (codifying Arizona’s provisions governing living wills); 
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.031 (West 2012) (codifying Texas’s 
provisions governing directives to physicians). 
 12. Under many state laws, a medical power of attorney, sometimes called a health 
care power of attorney, is a document in which an individual (the principal) appoints a 
second individual (the agent) to make decisions regarding the administration, 
withholding, or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment in the event that the first 
individual has a terminal or an irreversible condition.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 36-3221–36-3224 (2008) (codifying Arizona’s provisions governing health care 
powers of attorney); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.151-166.166 (West 
2012) (codifying Texas’s provisions governing medical powers of attorney; id. § 
166.002(11) (defining medical power of attorney under Texas law). 
 13. See infra Part I.B.1-3. 
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individual.  By further example, the surrogate, including a surrogate 
related to the elderly individual by blood, such as a parent or child, may 
have religious or cultural views regarding the withholding or withdrawal 
of life-sustaining treatment that conflict with the views that were held by 
the elderly individual while competent.  In this case, again, the interests 
of the surrogate would conflict with those of the elderly individual.  By 
still further example, a surrogate who was romantically linked with the 
elderly individual may develop a new romantic interest and, therefore, 
may wish to minimize future ties to and care obligations associated with 
the former romantic interest.  Here, again, the interests of the surrogate 
would conflict with those of the elderly individual with whom the 
surrogate formerly had a romantic interest.  By final example, a 
physician or other health care provider of the elderly individual who 
serves as the individual’s surrogate may have a financial interest in 
administering treatment to the individual if the individual is a paying or 
otherwise well-insured patient or, alternatively, in withholding or 
withdrawing treatment from the individual if the individual happens to be 
a non-paying or uninsured patient.  Here, too, the physician or other 
provider’s interests would conflict with those of the elderly individual. 
Part I begins by describing federal law, as well as three sets of 
illustrative state laws, that address the identification and management of 
these types of conflicts of interest in the context of surrogate consent to 
treatment on behalf of elderly individuals who have impaired decision-
making capacity.  In particular, laws from Pennsylvania, Arizona, and 
Nevada are used to illustrate an extremely comprehensive, a moderately 
comprehensive, and a bare-bones approach, respectively, to the 
identification and management of conflicts of interest in the context of 
surrogate health care decision-making.  Using these state laws as 
examples, this Part highlights statutory features that are desirable due to 
the assistance they provide with respect to identifying, managing, and 
minimizing conflicts of interest.  This Part concludes that, although it 
cannot eliminate all conflicted decision making, Pennsylvania has a very 
good model for the identification and management of conflicts of interest 
in the context of surrogate health care decision making.  Arizona and 
Nevada, on the other hand, leave elderly individuals with impaired 
decision-making capacity susceptible to conflicted surrogate decision 
making. 
A. Federal Law 
Other than general references to the doctrine of informed consent to 
treatment and state law provisions regarding legal representatives, 
federal health law does not specifically address impaired clinical 
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decision-making capacity, first-person consent to treatment, or surrogate 
consent to treatment.
14
  For example, federal regulations that establish 
requirements applicable to Medicare-participating hospitals simply 
provide: 
The patient or his or her representative (as allowed under State law) 
has the right to make informed decisions regarding his or her care.  
The patient’s rights include being informed of his or her health status, 
being involved in care planning and treatment, and being able to 
request or refuse treatment.
15
 
Federal regulations governing Medicare-participating hospices, which 
provide palliative care to patients with terminal conditions, similarly give 
hospice patients a general right to be involved in the development of 
their own hospice plans of care, as well as the right to refuse unwanted 
care.
16
  If a hospice patient has been adjudged incompetent under state 
law by a court of proper jurisdiction, federal regulations provide that “the 
rights of the [hospice] patient are to be exercised by the person appointed 
pursuant to state law to act on the patient’s behalf.”17  “If a state court 
has not adjudged a [hospice] patient incompetent,” federal law provides 
that “any legal representative designated by the patient in accordance 
with state law may exercise the patient’s rights to the extent allowed by 
state law.”18  Federal regulations governing Medicare-participating 
nursing homes also are general in nature:  “[u]nless adjudged 
incompetent or otherwise found to be incapacitated under the laws of the 
State, [patients have the right to] participate in planning care and 
treatment or changes in care and treatment.”19 
B. State Law 
Unlike federal law, most states have enacted laws that do some or 
all of the following:  (i) define competency, decision-making capacity, or 
incapacity; (ii) establish the process for obtaining the informed consent 
of patients with capacity; (iii) establish the process for following 
advanced health care planning instructions under a directive to physician 
or medical power of attorney in the event a patient lacks capacity; 
(iv) establish the process for obtaining surrogate consent in the event a 
patient lacks capacity and has not executed an advanced health care 
 
 14. The text in this Part I.A and accompanying notes 14-18 is taken with permission 
and only technical changes from Tovino, supra note 2, Part II. 
 15. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(b)(2) (2012). 
 16. Id. § 418.52(c)(2)-(3). 
 17. Id. § 418.52(b)(2). 
 18. Id. § 418.52(b)(3). 
 19. Id. § 483.10(d)(3). 
  
2013] CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MEDICINE, RESEARCH, AND LAW 1299 
planning document and for whom a guardian has not been appointed; 
(v) identify the persons in priority order who are eligible to serve as a 
surrogate for health care decisions in the absence of an advanced health 
care planning document and guardian-made decision; and (vi) identify 
the standard that such surrogate should use in deciding whether to 
consent to the administration, withholding, or withdrawal of medical 
treatment on behalf of the patient.
20
  Three illustrative state laws are 
examined below. 
1. Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania has enacted a comprehensive Health Care Agents and 
Representatives Act (“Pennsylvania Act”)21 that allows certain “health 
care representatives” to make a health care decision for an individual 
whose attending physician has determined is incompetent if the 
individual does not have a health care power of attorney and a guardian 
has not been appointed for the individual.
22
 
Under the Pennsylvania Act, there are two different methods for 
identifying a health care representative.
23
  First, “an individual of sound 
mind may, by a signed writing or by personally informing the attending 
physician or the health care provider, designate one or more individuals 
to act as health care representative.”24  Because many individuals, 
including many elderly individuals, will not have identified in writing or 
through another means of communication a representative before they 
become incompetent, the Pennsylvania Act also allows any member of 
the following classes, in descending order of priority, who is reasonably 
available, to act as a health care representative:  (i) the individual’s 
spouse, unless an action for divorce is pending, and the adult children of 
the individual who are not the children of the spouse; (ii) an adult child; 
(iii) a parent; (iv) an adult brother or sister; (v) an adult grandchild; and 
(vi) an adult who has knowledge of the principal’s preferences and 
values including, but not limited to, religious and moral beliefs, to assess 
how the individual would make health care decisions.
25
 The 
 
 20. See generally UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT (1993). 
 21. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5451-5465 (West 2012). 
 22. Id. § 5461(a)(1)-(3).  Health care representatives are authorized to make health 
care decisions under the Pennsylvania Act if the individual’s health care agent under the 
power of attorney is not reasonably available, or has indicated an unwillingness to act, 
and no alternative health care agent is reasonably available.  Id. 
 23. Id. § 5461(d)(1). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. § 5461(d)(1)(i)-(vi).  Under Pennsylvania law: 
(1) If more than one member of a class assumes authority to act as a health care 
representative, the members do not agree on a health care decision and the 
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Pennsylvania Act allows an individual, by signed writing, to provide for 
a different order of priority,
26
 and to disqualify one or more persons from 
acting as the individual’s health care representative.27 
Keeping in mind potential conflicts of interest, the Pennsylvania 
Act establishes several limitations on the persons who may serve as an 
individual’s health care representative.  First, unless the person is related 
by blood, marriage, or adoption to the individual, the following persons 
may not serve as an individual’s health care representative:  (i) the 
individual’s attending physician; (ii) another health care provider to the 
individual; and (iii) anyone who owns, operates, or is employed by a 
health care provider in which the individual receives health care.
28
  These 
provisions are designed to ensure that a physician, other health care 
provider, or owner or operator of a health care-providing institution who 
may have a financial interest in providing additional treatment to a 
paying or otherwise well-insured patient or, alternatively, declining 
additional treatment to a non-paying or otherwise uninsured patient, will 
not be placed in that conflicted position. 
Second, an individual of sound mind, including an elderly 
individual who regains “sound mind,” “may countermand any health care 
decision made by the [individual’s] health care representative at any time 
and in any manner by personally informing the attending physician or 
health care provider.”29  And, regardless of the individual’s mental or 
physical capacity, the individual “may countermand a health care 
decision made by the [individual’s] health care representative that would 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment at any time and in any 
manner by personally informing the individual’s attending physician.”30 
 
attending physician or health care provider is so informed, the attending 
physician or health care provider may rely on the decision of a majority of the 
members of that class who have communicated their views to the attending 
physician or health care provider. 
(2) If the members of the class of health care representatives are evenly divided 
concerning the health care decision and the attending physician or health care 
provider is so informed, an individual having a lower priority may not act as a 
health care representative. So long as the class remains evenly divided, no 
decision shall be deemed made until such time as the parties resolve their 
disagreement. Notwithstanding such disagreement, nothing in this subsection 
shall be construed to preclude the administration of health care treatment in 
accordance with accepted standards of medical practice. 
Id. § 5461(g)(1)-(2). 
 26. Id. § 5461(d)(2). 
 27. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5461(e) (West 2012). 
 28. Id. § 5461(f). 
 29. Id. § 5461(i)(1). 
 30. Id. § 5461(i)(2). 
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The Pennsylvania Act also establishes the standard of decision 
making for health care representatives by adopting the standard of 
decision making that applies to health care agents under health care 
powers of attorney.
31
  That is, except as otherwise provided in a health 
care power of attorney, a health care representative shall have the 
authority to make any health care decision and to exercise any right and 
power regarding the individual’s care, custody, and health care treatment 
that the individual could have made and exercised, including the 
authority to make anatomical gifts, dispose of remains, and consent to 
autopsies.
32
 
To assist the health care representative in making a treatment 
decision that would be in the individual’s best interests, the Pennsylvania 
Act does require the health care representative to gather information on 
the individual’s prognosis and acceptable medical alternatives regarding 
diagnosis, treatments, and supportive care.
33
  In the case of health care 
decisions regarding the end of life of an individual with an end-stage 
medical condition, the information shall distinguish between curative 
alternatives, palliative alternatives, and alternatives that will merely serve 
to prolong the process of dying.
34
  The information also shall distinguish 
between the individual’s end-stage medical condition and any other 
concurrent disease, illness, or physical, mental, cognitive, or intellectual 
condition that predated the principal’s end-stage medical condition.35 
The Pennsylvania Act is designed to assist the health care 
representative in following any instructions left by the individual and, if 
there are no instructions, making decisions in accordance with the 
individual’s preferences and values.  That is, after consultation with 
health care providers and consideration of the information described in 
the previous paragraph, the Pennsylvania Act requires the health care 
representative to make health care decisions in accordance with the 
health care representative’s understanding and interpretation of the 
instructions, including any clear written or verbal directions that cover 
the situation presented and that were given by the individual at a time 
when the individual had the capacity to understand, make, and 
communicate health care decisions, if they exist.
36
  In the absence of 
instruction, which is a common occurrence among elderly individuals 
with impaired decision-making capacity, the health care representative 
 
 31. Id. § 5461(c) (adopting generally the standard applicable to health care agents, 
codified at id. § 5456). 
 32. Id. § 5456(a). 
 33. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5456(c)(1) (West 2012). 
 34. Id. § 5456(c)(3). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. § 5456(c)(4). 
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shall make health care decisions that conform to the health care 
representative’s assessment of the individual’s preferences and values, 
including religious and moral beliefs.
37
 
If the health care representative does not know enough about the 
individual’s instructions, preferences, and values to decide accordingly, 
the health care representative shall take into account what the 
representative knows of the individual’s instructions, preferences, and 
values, including religious and moral beliefs, and the health care 
representative’s assessment of the individual’s best interests, taking into 
consideration the goals and considerations of:  (i) the preservation of life; 
(ii) the relief from suffering; and (iii) the preservation or restoration of 
functioning, taking into account any concurrent disease, illness, or 
physical, mental, cognitive, or intellectual condition that may have 
predated the individual’s end-stage medical condition.38 
In the absence of a specific written authorization or direction by an 
individual to withhold or withdraw nutrition and hydration administered 
by gastric tube or intravenously or by other artificial or invasive means, 
the Pennsylvania Act does specify that the health care representative 
shall presume that the individual would not want nutrition and hydration 
withheld or withdrawn.
39
  However, this presumption may be overcome 
by the previously clear expressed wishes of the individual to the 
contrary.
40
  In the absence of such clearly expressed wishes, the 
presumption may be overcome if the health care representative considers 
the values and preferences of the individual and assesses the factors set 
forth in the previous paragraph, and determines it is clear that the 
individual would not wish for artificial nutrition and hydration to be 
initiated or continued.
41
 
Without a written advanced health care planning document, such as 
a directive to physician or medical power of attorney, that specifies an 
elderly individual’s preferences and instructions regarding future health 
care decisions, we can never be sure what the now incompetent elderly 
individual would want, and surrogacy legislation is always going to be 
the second best option.  However, the Pennsylvania Act does as good a 
job as possible of attempting to minimize conflicts of interest by 
preventing certain classes of persons from serving as a surrogate and by 
establishing a detailed process that attempts to assist the surrogate in 
 
 37. Id. § 5456(c)(5)(i). 
 38. Id. § 5456(c)(5)(ii)(A)-(C). 
 39. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5456(c)(5)(iii)(A) (West 2012). 
 40. Id. § 5456(c)(5)(iii)(B). 
 41. Id. 
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making a decision that would be in alignment with the elderly 
individual’s preferences and values. 
Unfortunately, it is possible even under the carefully drafted 
Pennsylvania Act for a health care representative to make a decision that 
is not in accordance with the individual’s preferences and values by 
simply claiming that “it is clear” that such a decision is consistent with 
the elderly individual’s preferences and values.  Stated another way, it is 
still possible, even under the comprehensive and detailed Pennsylvania 
Act, for a surrogate who stands to inherit money or property from an 
elderly individual, or a surrogate who was formerly romantically linked 
with the elderly individual but has developed a new romantic interest in a 
second person, or any other surrogate whose interests diverge from those 
of the elderly individual, to hide those interests and make a decision to 
administer, withhold, or withdraw treatment from the individual when 
such decision would not be consistent with what the individual would 
have wanted. 
In addition, note that the Pennsylvania Act prioritizes spouses over 
children, children over parents, parents over siblings, siblings over 
grandchildren, and grandchildren over other individuals who have 
knowledge of the individual’s preferences and values in terms of persons 
who may serve as a surrogate.  This scheme works extremely well for 
elderly individuals who are in traditional, heterosexual, legally-
recognized marriages and whose spouses have interests that converge 
with their own.  The Pennsylvania General Assembly may have codified 
this priority list of surrogates due to its belief that more state residents 
would be in interest-convergent, legally-recognized, and heterosexual 
marriages and, therefore, that the default provision giving highest 
priority to a spouse would serve more Pennsylvanians than any other 
default provision.  Of course, we must recognize that this default 
provision will not serve every Pennsylvanian.  If an elderly individual 
does not have a spouse and, instead, has a domestic partner or significant 
other whose interests converge with the elderly individual’s interests, 
that partner or significant other may not have a chance to make a 
decision that would be in the elderly individual’s best interests because 
another person would have priority over the partner or significant other.  
If that other person has interests that diverge from the interests of the 
elderly individual, the Pennsylvania Act essentially allows the conflicted 
individual to serve as the surrogate over the unconflicted partner or 
significant other. 
In summary, the Pennsylvania Act does a good job of attempting to 
manage conflicts of interest in the context of surrogate health care 
decision making, but the Act does not completely remove the possibility 
of conflicted decision making. 
  
1304 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117:4 
2. Arizona 
Under Arizona’s Surrogate Decision Makers Act (“Arizona Act”),42 
if an adult individual is unable to make or communicate a health care 
treatment decision, a health care provider shall make a reasonable effort 
to locate and follow an advanced health care planning document or to 
locate and consult the individual’s appointed guardian, if any.43  If the 
individual has not executed an advanced health care planning document 
and does not have a guardian, then certain classes of persons may serve 
as surrogate decision makers for the individual if the individual is found 
“incapable,”44 although the Arizona Act does not appear to define 
“incapable.” 
In priority order, the Arizona Act lists six classes of persons who 
may serve as a surrogate decision maker for an “incapable” individual, 
including:  (i) the individual’s spouse, unless the individual and spouse 
are legally separated; (ii) an adult child of the individual or, if the 
individual has more than one adult child, a majority of the adult children 
who are reasonably available for consultation; (iii) a parent of the 
individual; (iv) if the individual is unmarried, the individual’s domestic 
partner; (v) a brother or sister of the individual; and (vi) a “close friend” 
of the individual, with “close friend” defined as “an adult who has 
exhibited special care and concern for the [individual], who is familiar 
with the [individual]’s health care views and desires and who is willing 
and able to become involved in the [individual]’s health care and to act 
in the [individual]’s best interest.”45 
 In terms of the standard of decision making, the Arizona Act simply 
provides that the surrogate has “the authority to make health care 
decisions for the [individual] and . . . shall follow the patient’s wishes if 
they are known.”46  The Arizona law does not clarify the standard of 
decision making that should apply if the individual’s wishes are not 
known, other than to state that a surrogate who is not the individual’s 
agent or guardian is not permitted to make decisions to admit the 
individual to certain behavioral health facilities under certain 
conditions.
47
 
If the health care provider cannot locate any of the persons who are 
eligible to serve as a surrogate, the individual’s attending physician may 
make a health care treatment decision for the individual after the 
 
 42. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3231 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 43. Id. § 36-3231(A). 
 44. Id. § 36-3231(A), (D). 
 45. Id. § 36-3231(A)(1)-(6). 
 46. Id. § 36-3231(A). 
 47. Id. § 36-3231(D)-(E). 
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physician consults with and obtains the recommendations of an 
institutional ethics committee.
48
  If a consultation with an institutional 
ethics committee is not possible, the physician may make a decision after 
consulting with a second physician who concurs with the physician’s 
decision.  Unlike the comprehensive Pennsylvania Act, the Arizona Act 
provides no further detail regarding surrogate health care decision 
making in the context of adults, including elderly persons, with impaired 
decision-making capacity. 
The Arizona Act is less desirable than the Pennsylvania Act for 
several reasons.  First, unlike the Pennsylvania Act, the Arizona Act does 
not do a good job of attempting to minimize conflicts of interest by 
preventing certain classes of persons from serving as a surrogate.  The 
only conflict recognized by the Arizona Act is the possibility that a 
surrogate might want to admit an elderly individual to a behavioral 
health facility when such admission might not be in the interests of the 
elderly individual.  In addition, the Arizona Act actually allows the 
elderly individual’s physician to make a health care decision for the 
elderly individual as long as the physician consults with an ethics 
committee or, if an ethics committee consultation is not possible, if the 
elderly individual consults with a second physician.  Because the first 
physician or the second physician may have an interest in administering, 
withholding, or withdrawing treatment based on whether such 
administration, withholding, or withdrawal would be in the physician’s, 
hospital’s, or someone else’s financial or other interest, it is possible that 
the decision made by the physician will not be in the health interests of 
the elderly individual. 
Second, the Arizona Act does not establish a detailed process, or 
really any process at all, that would help the surrogate in making a 
decision that would be in alignment with the elderly individual’s 
preferences and values.  If the surrogate does not know what the elderly 
individual’s wishes are, then the surrogate appears to be able to make 
any health care decision for the elderly individual, regardless of whose 
interest the decision is in, and there appears to be no oversight of that 
decision by any type of independent or third-party monitor. 
Third, the Arizona Act suffers from the same problem that the 
Pennsylvania Act does in that the Arizona Act prioritizes certain 
individuals who may have interests that diverge from the interests of the 
elderly individual, over other individuals whose interests may be more 
 
 48. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3221(B) (LexisNexis 2012).  An “institutional ethics 
committee” is defined as a “standing committee of a licensed health care institution 
appointed or elected to render advice concerning ethical issues involving medical 
treatment.”  Id. 
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closely aligned with those of the elderly individual.  In particular, note 
that the Arizona Act prioritizes spouses over children, children over 
parents, parents over domestic partners, domestic partners over siblings, 
and siblings over close friends.  Again, this scheme works extremely 
well for elderly individuals who happen to be in legally-recognized 
marriages and whose spouses have interests that converge with their 
own.  The Arizona State Legislature may have codified this priority list 
of surrogates due to its belief that more state residents would be in 
interest-convergent, legally-recognized marriages and, therefore, that the 
default provision would serve more Arizonans than any other default 
provision.  However, the default provision will not serve everyone.  
Again, if an elderly individual does not have a spouse and, instead, has a 
domestic partner or close friend whose interests converge with the 
elderly individual’s interests, that partner or friend may not have a 
chance to make a decision that would be in the elderly individual’s best 
interests because another person would have priority over the partner or 
friend.  If that other person has interests that diverge from the interests of 
the elderly individual, the Arizona Act essentially allows the conflicted 
person to serve as the surrogate over the unconflicted partner or friend. 
In summary, the Arizona Act does not do a good job of identifying 
potential conflicts of interest, attempting to minimize such conflicts, or 
assisting surrogates in making decisions that would serve the interests of 
the elderly individual. 
3. Nevada 
Nevada is unique in that it does not even have a default provision 
identifying the classes of persons who may provide surrogate consent to 
the administration of treatment in the absence of an advanced health care 
planning document.  That is, if an elderly individual with impaired 
decision-making capacity has not executed an advanced health care 
planning document and has no guardian, Nevada law simply does not 
address whether, or how, a surrogate can consent to the affirmative 
provision of health care, whether such care is a medically necessary 
diagnostic examination, medical treatment, surgical procedure, or 
prescription drug. 
However, Nevada does have a default provision that identifies the 
classes of persons who may provide surrogate consent to the withholding 
or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from the individual if the 
individual has not executed an advanced health care planning document 
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called a “declaration”49 and a guardian has not been judicially appointed 
for the individual.
50
  Codified within Nevada’s Uniform Act on Rights of 
the Terminally Ill (“Nevada Act”),51 the provision gives a surrogate the 
authority to consent to the withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment from an individual who does not have an effective declaration 
and for whom a guardian has not been appointed if the individual has 
been determined by the individual’s attending physician to be in a 
terminal condition
52
 and is no longer able to make decisions regarding 
the administration of life-sustaining treatment.
53
 
The following classes of persons, in the following order of priority, 
may serve as surrogates in Nevada:  (i) the spouse of the individual; (ii) 
an adult child of the individual or, if there is more than one adult child, a 
majority of the adult children who are reasonably available for 
consultation; (iii) the parents of the individual; (iv) an adult sibling of the 
individual or, if there is more than one adult sibling, a majority of the 
adult siblings who are reasonably available for consultation; or (v) the 
nearest other adult relative of the individual by blood or adoption who is 
reasonably available for consultation.
54
 The only other relevant provision 
in the Nevada Act provides that a decision made by a surrogate to 
consent to the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment on 
behalf of an individual must be made in “good faith” and that such 
consent would not be valid “if it conflicts with the expressed intention of 
the patient.”55 
The Nevada Act is the least helpful of the three state statutes 
surveyed.  Because the affirmative administration of health care, 
including the performance of medically necessary diagnostic 
 
 49. A “declaration” is the name given under Nevada law to the document that an 
individual may sign that would appoint another person to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining treatment from the individual in the event the individual is in an incurable and 
irreversible condition.  See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.610-449.611 (2011).  Nevada’s 
“declaration” is the functional equivalent of other states’ medical powers of attorney or 
health care powers of attorney; cf. supra note 12. 
 50. NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.626(1)(b) (2011); id. § 449.613(2). 
 51. See id. §§ 449.535-449.690. 
 52. Nevada defines a “terminal condition” as an “incurable and irreversible 
condition that, without the administration of life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinion 
of the attending physician, result in death within a relatively short time.”  Id. § 449.590. 
 53. Id. § 449.626(1)(a)-(b); see also id. § 449.617 (stating that the declaration 
becomes operative when “the declarant is determined by the attending physician to be in 
a terminal condition and no longer able to make decisions regarding administration of 
life-sustaining treatment”). 
 54. Id. § 449.626(2).  “If a class entitled to decide whether to consent is not 
reasonably available for consultation and competent to decide, or declines to decide, the 
next class is authorized to decide, but an equal division in a class does not authorize the 
next class to decide.”  Id. § 449.626(3). 
 55. Id. § 449.626(4). 
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examinations, treatments, and surgical procedures, will be in the interests 
of many elderly individuals who are or may be ill, the fact that the 
Nevada Act fails to provide legislative authority for a surrogate to 
consent to such health care is troubling. 
Although the Nevada Act does provide legislative authority for 
surrogate consent to the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment, it does so in a manner that, like the Arizona Act, fails to 
identify possible conflicts of interest, barely makes an attempt to 
minimize such conflicts, and fails to assist surrogates in making 
withholding and withdrawal decisions that will serve the interests of the 
elderly individual.  The criticisms applicable to the Arizona Act apply 
with equal force to the Nevada Act. 
The only evidence that the Nevada Act contemplated a conflict of 
interest might occur is through the statutory provision that provides that a 
surrogate, when making a decision to consent to withhold or withdraw 
life-sustaining treatment, shall make the decision in “good faith” and that 
consent will not be valid “if it conflicts with the expressed intention of 
the patient.”56  Stated another way, the Nevada Act recognizes that some 
surrogates may act in bad faith, and the Nevada Act technically would 
invalidate a bad faith decision, although the Act provides no guidance to 
a physician, third-party monitor, or other individual with oversight 
regarding how to determine whether a surrogate is acting in bad faith.  
The Nevada Act also recognizes that, if the elderly individual happened 
to have expressed a preference for the maintenance of life-sustaining 
treatment, a decision by a surrogate to withhold or withdraw such life-
sustaining treatment would constitute a conflict of interest.  However, the 
Nevada Act completely ignores the fact that many elderly individuals 
with impaired decision-making capacity will have failed to express a past 
preference regarding the desirability of life-sustaining treatment and will 
have insufficient capacity to express a current preference.  In these cases, 
the Nevada Act opens the door for a surrogate to make a decision to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment when such decision could 
conflict with the unexpressed preferences of the elderly individual. 
 
 56. NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.626(4) (2011). 
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II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH 
The previous Part compared and contrasted illustrative state laws 
governing conflicts of interest in clinical medicine (or, treatment for 
shorthand) involving elderly individuals with impaired decision-making 
capacity.  This Part will compare and contrast illustrative state laws 
governing conflicts of interest in human subjects research (or, research 
for shorthand).  First, however, the concepts of treatment and research 
must be distinguished. 
Treatment and research are intrinsically different concepts.
57
  
Treatment may be defined as “the provision, coordination, or 
management of health care and related services by one or more health 
care providers” to a particular individual.58  The definition of treatment is 
based on the concept of health care, which has been defined as care, 
services, and procedures related to the health of a particular individual.
59
  
Health care is frequently defined to include preventive, diagnostic, 
therapeutic, rehabilitative, maintenance, or palliative care that is 
provided to a particular individual, as well as counseling, assessments, 
and procedures that relate to the physical or mental condition or 
functional status of a particular individual.
60
  Activities are thus classified 
as treatment when they involve a health care service provided by a health 
care provider that is tailored to the specific preventive, diagnostic, 
therapeutic, or other health care needs of a particular individual.
61
 
Research, on the other hand, is defined as a systematic 
investigation—including research development, testing, and 
evaluation—that is designed to develop or contribute to generalizable 
knowledge.
62
  Knowledge is considered generalizable when it can be 
applied to either a population inside or outside of the population served 
 
 57. The introductory text in Part II and accompanying notes 58-75 is taken with 
permission and with only technical changes from Tovino, supra note 2, Parts I, IV. 
 58. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2012) (definition of treatment set forth in the 
federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule). 
 59. See, e.g., id. § 160.103 (definition of health care set forth in the federal HIPAA 
Privacy Rule). 
 60. See, e.g., id. 
 61. See, e.g., Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82,462, 82,626 (Dec. 28, 2000) [hereinafter HIPAA Privacy Rule] (“The activities 
described by ‘treatment,’ therefore, all involve health care providers supplying health 
care to a particular patient.  While many activities beneficial to patients are offered to 
entire populations or involve examining health information about entire populations, 
treatment involves health services provided by a health care provider and tailored to the 
specific needs of an individual patient.”). 
 62. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (definition of research set forth in the federal 
Common Rule); id. § 164.501 (definition of research set forth in the federal HIPAA 
Privacy Rule). 
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by the institution conducting the research.
63
  The purpose of research, 
then, is to collect data that will lead to the creation of generalizable 
knowledge that may result in the production of new therapies or the 
improvement of existing therapies.
64
 
Compared side by side, the differences between treatment and 
research become clear.  First, the primary purpose of treatment is to 
maintain or improve a particular patient’s health, whereas the primary 
purpose of research is to gain knowledge that will result in the creation 
of new treatments for a class of future patients.
65
  Second, physicians 
providing treatment frequently adjust, substitute, and change therapies to 
meet the specific health needs of particular patients.
66
  Investigators 
conducting research, however, must follow approved research protocols 
and are not permitted to adjust, substitute, or change the experimental 
intervention in response to the wants or needs of a particular 
participant.
67
  Third, a treating physician has a primary duty of loyalty to 
 
 63. See, e.g., HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 61, at 82,625. 
 64. See Rebecca Dresser, The Ubiquity and Utility of the Therapeutic 
Misconception, 19 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 271, 272 (2002) (“Although some research 
participants may receive a health benefit, research is designed to generate data that could 
lead to improved care for future patients.”); id. at 285 (“[I]nvestigators in the research 
setting focus primarily on the need to obtain valid scientific data.”); Gail E. Henderson et 
al., Clinical Trials and Medical Care: Defining the Therapeutic Misconception, 4 PLOS 
MED. 1735, 1737 (2007) (“[T]here is consensus that the defining characteristic of 
research is to create generalizable knowledge through answering a scientific question.”); 
id. (“Clinical research is designed to produce generalizable knowledge and to answer 
questions about the safety and efficacy of intervention(s) under study in order to 
determine whether or not they may be useful for the care of future patients.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 64, at 285 (“[P]hysicians in the medical setting 
seek solely to benefit the patient.  In contrast, investigators in the research setting focus 
primarily on the need to obtain valid scientific data.”). 
 66. See id. at 272 (“After treatment begins, medication dosages may be increased if 
the patient fails to respond to the standard dosage, or decreased if the patient experiences 
unwanted side effects.  Patients who fail to improve when taking one medication may be 
switched to another one.”). 
 67. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Clarifying the Ethics of Clinical Research: A Path 
Toward Avoiding the Therapeutic Misconception, 2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 22, 22 (2002) 
(explaining that the use of randomization, double-blind procedures, adherence to strict 
protocols, and administration of placebos in research studies “may be undertaken because 
they advance the scientific validity of the research study, rather than because they serve 
the subject”); Paul S. Appelbaum, Charles W. Lidz & Thomas Grisso, Therapeutic 
Misconception in Clinical Research: Frequency and Risk Factors, 26 IRB: ETHICS & 
HUM. RES. 1, 1 (2004) (explaining that researchers are required to protect the validity of 
the data they generate by using techniques such as randomized assignment, placebo 
control groups, double-blind procedures, and fixed treatment protocols, which often 
preclude personalized decisions from being made); Dresser, supra note 64, at 272 
(“Research methods that minimize ambiguity and bias in data collection rule out the 
individualized approach that is the hallmark of clinical care.  In research, the intervention 
an individual receives is usually determined by random assignment instead of a 
physician’s clinical judgment.”).  Although research participants have a legal right to 
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his or her patients and is charged with recommending treatments that the 
physician believes to be in each patient’s best interests.68  On the other 
hand, researchers who do not also have a treatment relationship with 
their research participants are not considered to have a fiduciary or 
primary duty of loyalty to their research participants.
69
  In theory, 
 
withdraw from a research study at any time, they do not have the right to adjust, 
substitute, or change an experimental intervention.  45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(8) (2010). 
 68. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: OPINION 10.015 (2001), 
available at http://bit.ly/10pFfMq.  The American Medical Association opines: 
The relationship between patient and physician is based on trust and gives rise 
to physicians’ ethical obligations to place patients’ welfare above their own 
self-interest and above obligations to other groups, and to advocate for their 
patients’ welfare.  Within the patient-physician relationship, a physician is 
ethically required to use sound medical judgment, holding the best interests of 
the patient as paramount. 
Id.; accord The Hippocratic Oath, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (last visited Mar. 28, 2013), 
http://1.usa.gov/sx5h5 (pledging that the physician will “benefit [his or her] patients 
according to [his or her] greatest ability and judgment”); TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. 
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 173 (5th ed. 2001) (explaining that the 
goal of medicine is to promote the welfare of individual patients). 
 69. See, e.g., Suthers v. Amgen, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 2d 416, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(refusing to find a fiduciary duty running from the sponsor of an independent research 
study to the individuals who participated in the research); Greenberg v. Miami Children’s 
Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1072 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (refusing to find a 
fiduciary duty running from Canavan disease researchers to their research participants); 
Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 486 (Cal. 1990) (explaining that the 
regents of the defendant university and its affiliated researchers were not physicians and 
therefore did not owe the plaintiff patient a fiduciary duty), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 
(1991); Dresser, supra note 64, at 292 (recommending that researchers explain to 
participants as part of the consent-to-research process that their primary loyalty is to 
future patients, not current research participants).  Notwithstanding these cases, some 
attorneys who represent research participants continue to assert that the researcher-
participant relationship constitutes a fiduciary relationship.  See, e.g., Alan C. Milstein, 
Research Malpractice and the Issue of Incidental Findings, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 356, 
358 (2008).  Milstein states: 
Once the research subject or the guardian for a minor subject signs the 
informed consent document, a fiduciary relationship is formed between the 
[principal investigator] and the research subject.  The very nature of scientific 
research on human subjects creates special relationships out of which fiduciary 
duties arise, similar to the physician/patient relationship.  The fiduciary 
relationship is formed not only by the informed consent agreement between the 
parties, but also by the trust the subject necessarily places in the researcher.  In 
the context of human subjects research, a special relationship is created 
between the human subject and those responsible for the design, approval, and 
implementation of the experiment because the latter have a duty to protect 
human subjects both under the Common Rule and common law. 
Id.  In addition, some courts have found that researchers have “special relationships” with 
their research participants that can give rise to unspecified tort-like duties.  See, e.g., 
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 846 (Md. 2001) (“[S]pecial 
relationships, out of which duties arise, the breach of which can constitute negligence, 
can result from the relationships between researcher and research subjects.”).  See 
generally Stacey A. Tovino, Incidental Findings: A Common Law Approach, 15 
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investigators design, and research participants consent to participate in, 
research protocols with the understanding of the differences between 
treatment and research
70
 and with the knowledge that research 
participation may not directly benefit the participant and may pose 
personal health and other risks to the participant.
71
 
Human subjects researchers, also called investigators, whose 
research is designed to improve clinical practice in the areas of 
neurology, psychiatry, geriatrics, emergency medicine, and critical care, 
among other specialties, frequently design research protocols that 
involve elderly individuals with impaired decision-making capacity.
72
  
Some of these protocols involve the neuroimaging of elderly individuals 
who have disorders of consciousness, including coma, vegetative state, 
and minimally conscious state.
73
  Other protocols are designed to 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY RES. 242, 250-54 (2008) (discussing the concepts of fiduciary duty and 
fiduciary relationships in the context of neuroimaging research). 
 70. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1) (2012) (requiring research participants to be 
informed that they are participating in research); id. § 46.102 (defining research as a 
systematic investigation—including research development, testing, and evaluation—that 
is designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge).  As discussed in more 
detail below, some research participants and researchers may be operating under a 
therapeutic misconception. 
 71. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2) (2010) (requiring research participants to be 
informed of reasonably foreseeable risks and discomforts before they may consent to 
participate in the research). 
 72. See, e.g., B. Lynn Beattie, Consent in Alzheimer’s Disease Research: 
Risk/Benefit Factors, 34 CAN. J. NEUROLOGICAL SCI. S27, S27 (2007) (noting that 
research in Alzheimer’s disease is complicated by the disease itself, which affects the 
subject’s decision-making capacity for participation in research); Scott Y. H. Kim et al., 
Assessing the Competence of Persons with Alzheimer’s Disease in Providing Informed 
Consent for Participation in Research, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 712, 712 (2001) (noting 
that even relatively mild Alzheimer’s disease can significantly impair consent-giving 
capacity in the research context and that research in the field of Alzheimer’s disease 
therapeutics requires participation by subjects with relatively mild Alzheimer’s disease); 
Ukamaka M. Oruche, Research with Cognitively Impaired Participants, 13 J. NURSING L. 
89, 89 (2009) (noting that research involving individuals with cognitive impairments is 
necessary to improve understanding of illnesses such as Alzheimer’s disease, 
Huntington’s chorea, cerebrovascular disease, psychiatric disorders, chronic alcoholism, 
and AIDS dementia complex). 
 73. See, e.g., Martin R. Coleman et al., Towards the Routine Use of Brain Imaging 
to Aid the Clinical Diagnosis of Disorders of Consciousness, 132 BRAIN 2541, 2541-52 
(2009) (describing the functional brain imaging findings from a group of 41 individuals 
with disorders of consciousness who undertook a hierarchical speech processing task and 
concluding that functional neuroimaging has the potential to inform the diagnostic 
decision-making process for persons with disorders of consciousness); Davinia 
Fernandez-Espejo, Combination of Diffusion Tensor and Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging During Recovery from the Vegetative State, 10 BMC NEUROLOGY 1 (2010) 
(using functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate cortical responses to passive 
language stimulation as well as task-induced deactivations related to the default-mode 
network in one patient in the vegetative state at one month post-ictus and twelve months 
later when he had recovered consciousness); Joseph J. Fins, Neuroethics, Neuroimaging, 
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investigate the safety and efficacy of experimental drugs and other 
interventions for elderly individuals who have mild, moderate, or severe 
dementia or mental illness and may have restricted or limited decision-
making capacity.
74
  Still other protocols, especially those designed to 
improve clinical practice in the emergency room, may involve 
experimental interventions for elderly individuals with mild, moderate, 
or severe traumatic brain injuries.
75
 
If an elderly individual has intact decision-making capacity, the 
elderly individual, in theory, can receive information regarding a 
research protocol, including the nature of the research and its risks and 
possible benefits, and make an informed decision regarding whether to 
 
and Disorders of Consciousness: Promise or Peril, 122 TRANSACTIONS AM. CLINICAL & 
CLIMATOLOGICAL ASS’N 336, 339-43 (2010) (reviewing research using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging and positron emission tomography to elucidate brain states); 
Olivia Gosseries et al., Disorders of Consciousness: What’s in a Name?, 28 
NEUROREHABILITATION 3, 5-9 (2011) (summarizing research studies designed to 
investigate the residual neural capacity of individuals with disorders of consciousness); 
Luaba Tshibanda et al., Neuroimaging After Coma, 52 NEURORADIOLOGY 15, 15-24 
(2010) (summarizing research studies using magnetic resonance spectroscopy, diffusion 
tensor imaging, and functional magnetic resonance imaging to assess patients with 
disorders of consciousness); Audrey Vanhaudenhuyse et al., Default Network 
Connectivity Reflects the Level of Consciousness in Non-Communicative Brain-Damaged 
Patients, 133 BRAIN 161, 161 (2010) (using functional magnetic resonance imaging to 
investigate default network connectivity in individuals with disorders of consciousness, 
including coma, vegetative state, minimally conscious state, and locked-in syndrome). 
 74. See, e.g., Linda Beuscher & Victoria T. Grando, Challenges in Conducting 
Qualitative Research with Persons with Dementia, 2 RES. GERONTOLOGICAL NURSING 6, 
7 (2009) (discussing consent to research and other challenging issues raised by the 
conduct of qualitative research involving individuals with dementia); Sabina Gainotti et 
al., How Are the Interests of Incapacitated Research Participants Protected Through 
Legislation? An Italian Study on Legal Agency for Dementia Patients, 5 PLOS ONE 1, 1 
(2010) (noting that research involving individuals with compromised mental ability can 
be ethically challenging due to their impaired ability to give free and informed consent); 
Scott Y. H. Kim et al., Surrogate Consent for Dementia Research: A National Survey of 
Older Americans, 72 NEUROLOGY 149, 149 (2009) [hereinafter Surrogate Consent] 
(noting that research in novel therapies for Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) rely on persons 
with AD as research subjects); Robin Pierce, A Changing Landscape for Advance 
Directives in Dementia Research, 70 SOC. SCI. & MED. 623, 623 (2010) (noting that one 
of the primary challenges to conducting research on dementia is the gradual loss of the 
capacity to consent to research participation by individuals with dementia). 
 75. See Je Sung You et al., Use of Diffusion-Weighted MRI in the Emergency 
Department for Unconscious Trauma Patients with Negative Brain CT, 27 EMERGENCY 
MED. J. 131, 131 (2010); see also Wusi Qiu et al., Effects of Unilateral Decompressive 
Craniectomy on Patients with Unilateral Acute Post-Traumatic Brain Swelling After 
Severe Traumatic Brain Injury, 13 CRITICAL CARE R185, R185 (2009) (finding that 
unilateral decompressive craniectomy (DC) lowers intracranial pressure, reducing the 
mortality rate and improving neurological outcomes over unilateral routine 
temporoparietal craniectomy; also finding that DC increases the incidence of delayed 
intracranial hematomas and subdural effusion, some of which need secondary surgical 
intervention). 
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participate in the research.  Unlike treatment, however, research 
involving even healthy individuals with intact capacity is fraught with 
conflicts of interest.  Many researchers have financial and other interests 
in their research—including sponsorship by pharmaceutical companies—
that result in their recommendation of research studies and aggressive 
research recruitment strategies vis-à-vis individuals for whom such 
research may not be in their best health interests.  As discussed above, 
remember that a researcher’s primary purpose in conducting research is 
to generate statistically significant data that will produce knowledge that 
will contribute to the creation of new treatments for a class of future 
patients, not to treat current patients.  Also, remember that investigators 
conducting research must follow approved research protocols and are not 
permitted to adjust, substitute, or change the experimental intervention 
(other than to allow the research participant to discontinue participation) 
in response to the wants or needs of a particular elderly individual.  
Further, remember that, although a treating physician has a primary duty 
of loyalty to his or her patients and is charged with recommending 
treatments that the physician believes to be in each patient’s best 
interests, researchers generally are not considered to have a fiduciary or 
primary duty of loyalty to their research participants.  In theory, 
investigators design, and research participants consent to participate in, 
research protocols with the understanding of the differences between 
treatment and research, and with the knowledge that research 
participation may not directly benefit the participant and may pose 
personal health risks to the participant.  However, as discussed 
elsewhere, it is unclear the extent to which research participants and 
researchers understand the differences between treatment and research, 
as well as the nature and extent of health risks proposed by research 
experiments.
76
  To summarize thus far, conflicts of interest, especially 
between researchers and research institutions on the one hand and 
research participants on the other hand, are inherent in research 
protocols, even when only healthy individuals participate. 
In research protocols involving elderly individuals with impaired 
decision-making capacity, the risk of conflicts is even greater.  An 
elderly research participant with impaired decision-making capacity may 
not be able to comprehend information provided about the nature of a 
research protocol, as well as its risks and benefits, and may not be able to 
make an informed decision regarding whether to consent to research 
participation.  In this case, if the elderly individual, when competent, did 
not execute an advanced research participation document establishing the 
 
 76. See Tovino, supra note 2, Part IV. 
  
2013] CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MEDICINE, RESEARCH, AND LAW 1315 
elderly individual’s preferences and providing instructions with respect 
to future research participation, federal law and some state laws allow—
as a default—certain classes of persons to provide what is known as 
“surrogate” consent to research participation.77 
The problem, of course, is that the surrogate decision maker may 
have interests that conflict with the interests that the elderly individual 
would identify if competent.  For example, the surrogate may have a 
risk-seeking personality and might wish to enroll the elderly individual in 
a physically risky research protocol that has some prospect of direct 
therapeutic benefit for the elderly individual even though the individual, 
while competent, would have taken a more risk-averse or risk-neutral 
approach and would only have participated in low-risk research 
protocols, even if such behavior meant missing out on the prospect of 
therapeutic benefit.  In this case, the surrogate’s interests would be in 
conflict with those of the elderly individual.  Alternatively, the opposite 
scenario might be the case.  That is, the surrogate might have a risk-
averse personality and might wish to exclude the elderly individual from 
participation in a risky research protocol even though the individual, 
while competent, would have wished to take on a risk associated with 
research that held out the prospect of direct therapeutic benefit.  In this 
case, too, the surrogate’s interests would be in conflict with those of the 
elderly individual. 
Research involving elderly individuals with impaired decision-
making capacity can involve many other types of conflicts of interest.  
For example, a surrogate might receive some type of benefit from 
enrolling an elderly individual in a research study, such as recruiter or 
researcher attention, relief of care-taking responsibilities during the time 
that the research experiment takes place, and even small financial or 
other incentives or benefits.  In all of these cases, the surrogate might 
have an incentive to enroll the elderly individual in the research study 
even though enrollment might not be in the elderly individual’s health 
interests. 
Of course, all of the conflicts of interest that apply to research 
involving healthy individuals with intact capacity also apply to research 
involving elderly individuals with impaired decision-making capacity.  
For example, a researcher might be receiving financial compensation for 
conducting the research from a pharmaceutical company and, therefore, 
may have an incentive to minimize the health risks associated with the 
research during informed consent conversations, even though it would be 
in the interests of the elderly individual or the surrogate to be made fully 
 
 77. See id. Part II. 
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aware of such risks.  By further example, researchers have an incentive 
to enroll as many participants as possible in their studies in order to 
improve their chances of producing statistically significant results even 
though the research experiment might not be in the health interests of all 
those who are encouraged to enroll. 
This Part begins by describing the patchwork of federal and state 
laws
78
 that address the identification and management of these types of 
conflicts of interest in the context of surrogate consent to research 
participation on behalf of elderly individuals who have impaired 
decision-making capacity.  In particular, laws from California, Virginia, 
and Nevada are used to illustrate an extremely comprehensive, a 
moderately comprehensive, and a nonexistent approach, respectively, to 
the identification and management of conflicts of interest in the context 
of surrogate research participation decision making.  This Part concludes 
that, although not all conflicts of interest can be eliminated, California 
and Virginia do a very good job of attempting to assist in the 
identification and management of conflicts of interest in the context of 
surrogate research participation decision making.  Nevada, on the other 
hand, leaves elderly individuals with impaired decision-making capacity 
susceptible to conflicted surrogate decision making. 
A. Federal Law 
In a previous article, I detailed three decades of policy uncertainty 
and failed attempts by the federal government to regulate human subjects 
research involving adults with impaired decision-making capacity.
79
  As 
noted in that article, the federal government teetered back and forth for 
several decades between the competing goals of fostering cutting-edge 
biomedical and behavioral health research and protecting vulnerable 
human subjects.
80
  One result is that federal law still does not contain 
specific regulations governing human subjects research involving adults 
with impaired decision-making capacity.
81
 
Particular issues on which federal and state policymakers (as well as 
researchers and research participant protectionists) disagree include the 
following:  (i) whether researchers should be required to demonstrate that 
 
 78. See infra Part II.A-B; see also Oruche, supra note 72, at 5 (summarizing gaps in 
federal and state regulation of human subjects research involving individuals with 
cognitive impairments). 
 79. See Tovino, supra note 2, Part I.  See generally Surrogate Consent, supra note 
74, at 149-50 (“[P]olicy uncertainties have continued for three decades . . . [b]ecause 
policy discussions regarding surrogate-based research have continued for three decades 
without a clear resolution.”). 
 80. See Tovino, supra note 2, Part I. 
 81. See id. Part I.A. 
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a research study classified as minimal risk
82
 relates to an individual’s 
psychiatric, neurological, or other condition before an individual with the 
condition is permitted to be enrolled in the research; (ii) whether it is 
ever permissible to enroll individuals with impaired decision-making 
capacity in research classified as greater than minimal risk and, if so, (A) 
whether the greater-than-minimal risk research intervention must hold 
out the prospect of direct benefit to the individual, (B) whether the 
individual is required to have executed an advance research directive 
through which the individual gave prior consent to research participation, 
(C) whether a surrogate may consent to the individual’s research 
participation in the absence of an advance research directive, and (D) 
whether a special standing panel or other similar body that has expertise 
in research involving individuals with impaired decision-making 
capacity also should be required to review and approve the individual’s 
research participation.
83
 
Today, most of these questions remain unanswered at the federal 
level.  The federal Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
does have regulations that generally govern the conduct of human subject 
research.  Known as the “Common Rule,”84 the regulations contain a 
“Basic Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects” (“Basic Policy”), 
which is codified at Subpart A of the Common Rule,
85
 as well as special 
provisions governing human subjects research involving three sets of 
vulnerable populations:  pregnant women, fetuses, and neonates 
(“Subpart B”);86 prisoners (“Subpart C”);87 and children (“Subpart D”).88 
The Common Rule does not, however, contain a special Subpart 
governing research involving adults in general or elderly individuals in 
particular with impaired decision-making capacity.  As a result, proposed 
research that would involve adults with impaired decision-making 
capacity must satisfy only the general provisions set forth in the Basic 
Policy.  One of these general provisions does relate to surrogate consent 
to research participation and provides that the institutional review board 
 
 82. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (2012) (“[M]inimal risk means that the probability and 
magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of 
themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of 
routine physical or psychological examinations or tests.”). 
 83. See, e.g., Surrogate Consent, supra note 74, at 149 (noting that policies for 
surrogate consent for research remain unsettled after decades of debate). 
 84. See Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research 
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44, 
512, 44,512 (July 26, 2011). 
 85. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-46.124 (2012). 
 86. Id. §§ 46.201-46.207. 
 87. See generally id. §§ 46.301-46.306. 
 88. See generally id. §§ 46.401-46.409. 
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(IRB) must ensure that informed consent to research participation has 
been obtained from each prospective subject or the subject’s legally 
authorized representative (LAR),
89
 defined elsewhere in the Basic Policy 
as “an individual or judicial or other body authorized under applicable 
law to consent on behalf of a prospective subject to the subject’s 
participation in the procedure(s) involved in the research.”90  The phrase 
applicable law is generally thought to refer to state law, although, as 
discussed in more detail in Parts II(B)(1)-(3) below, state law on this 
topic varies widely when it exists. 
In light of the Common Rule’s lack of specific guidance regarding 
research involving individuals with impaired decision-making capacity, 
several national commissions and federal agencies have issued non-
binding recommendations and responses to frequently asked questions 
relating to the conduct of research involving individuals with impaired 
decision-making capacity.
91
  As of this writing, however, HHS has yet to 
incorporate these informal recommendations and responses into formal 
federal regulations.  As a result, the conduct of human subject research 
involving elderly individuals with impaired decision-making capacity 
remains legally and ethically murky, especially in the context of multi-
state clinical trials, where more than one state law could govern different 
parts of the trial.
92
  
B. State Law 
Although the federal government has yet to issue regulations 
governing research involving adult or elderly individuals with impaired 
decision-making capacity, some states do have relevant laws, although 
these laws vary widely in their application, scope, and regulation when 
they exist.
93
  Below, laws from California, Virginia, and Nevada are used 
to illustrate the variety of approaches to surrogate consent to research 
 
 89. Id. §§ 46.111(a)(4), 46.116. 
 90. Id. § 46.102(c) (emphasis added). 
 91. See Tovino, supra note 2, Part II.A. 
 92. See Scott Y. H. Kim et al., Proxy and Surrogate Consent in Geriatric 
Neuropsychiatric Research: Update and Recommendations, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 797, 
797 (2004) (“Despite a wave of initiatives in the late 1990s to clarify policy, surrogate 
consent for research continues to be a murky legal area and incapable subjects in the 
United States still lack clear regulatory protection.”). 
 93. See id. at 798 (“Previous reviews of state laws and regulations on proxy or 
surrogate consent for research have revealed tremendous heterogeneity. . . .”).  See 
generally Elyn R. Saks et al., Proxy Consent to Research: The Legal Landscape, 8 YALE 
J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 37, 37-39 (2008) (surveying state laws governing consent 
to research by legally authorized representatives on behalf of individuals with impaired 
decision-making capacity). 
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participation and to highlight desirable and undesirable statutory 
features. 
1. California 
California’s Protection of Human Subjects in Medical 
Experimentation Act (“California Act”)94 allows a surrogate to consent to 
research participation on behalf of an elderly individual who is unable to 
consent, does not have an agent under a health care power of attorney, 
and does not have a conservator or guardian, but only if certain criteria 
are satisfied.
95
  First, the surrogate must have “reasonable knowledge of 
the subject.”96  Second, the surrogate must be selected from the following 
priority-ordered list of persons:  (i) the spouse of the individual; (ii) an 
individual as defined in Section 297 of the Family Code (a domestic 
partner); (iii) an adult son or daughter of the person; (iv) a custodial 
parent of the person; (v) any adult brother or sister of the person; (vi) any 
adult grandchild of the person; and (vii) an available adult relative with 
the closest degree of kinship to the person.
97
  Third, the elderly 
individual must not express dissent or resistance to research 
participation.
98
  Fourth, the research must relate to the cognitive 
impairment, lack of capacity, or serious or life-threatening disease and 
condition of the individual.
99
  Finally, the surrogate may not receive 
financial compensation for consenting to the elderly individual’s research 
participation.
100
 
If these criteria are satisfied, the surrogate shall, in making a 
decision whether to consent to research participation on behalf of the 
elderly individual, “exercise substituted judgment, and base decisions 
about participation in accordance with the person’s individual health care 
instructions, if any, and other wishes, to the extent known to the 
surrogate decision maker.”101  If the elderly individual did not leave any 
instructions and the surrogate does not know the elderly individual’s 
wishes, then the California Act provides that the surrogate shall “make 
the decision in accordance with the person’s best interests.”102  In 
determining the elderly individual’s best interests, the surrogate is 
required to consider the elderly individual’s “personal values and his or 
 
 94. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24170-24181 (West 2012). 
 95. See id. § 24178(c). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. § 24178(c)(3)-(9). 
 98. Id. § 24178(c). 
 99. Id. § 24178(b). 
 100. Id. § 24178(i). 
 101. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24178(g) (West 2012). 
 102. Id. 
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her best estimation of what the [individual] would have chosen if he or 
she were capable of making a decision.”103 
Finally, prior to making a research participation decision on behalf 
of the individual, the surrogate shall be fully informed of several matters, 
including the name of the sponsor or funding source, if any, of the 
research study,
104
 as well as the existence of any material financial stake 
or interest that the investigator or research institution has in the outcome 
of the medical experiment.
105
  The California Act defines “material” as 
$10,000 or more in securities, assets, salary, or other income.
106
 
Without an advanced research participation planning document that 
specifies an elderly individual’s preferences or instructions regarding 
participation in medical experimentation, we can never be sure whether 
an elderly individual would want to participate in research.  Surrogacy 
legislation, such as the California Act, is always going to be second best.  
However, like the Pennsylvania Act in the context of clinical medicine, 
the California Act does as good a job as possible of attempting to 
minimize conflicts of interest in the context of human subjects research 
by prohibiting certain persons, including individuals who receive 
financial compensation, from serving as surrogates and by establishing a 
detailed process that attempts to assist the surrogate in making a research 
participation decision that would be in alignment with the elderly 
individual’s preferences and values.  In particular, if an elderly individual 
with impaired decision-making capacity dissents or even expresses 
resistance to a medical experiment, the surrogate would be prohibited 
from enrolling the individual in a research study, essentially forcing an 
alignment of the individual’s and the surrogate’s interests.  Additionally, 
the California Act, in theory, requires the surrogate to make a decision 
that would be in the elderly individual’s best interests and forces the 
surrogate to consider the elderly individual’s values and what the 
individual would have chosen if he or she were capable of making a 
decision. 
Also note that the California Act requires the research to relate to 
the cognitive impairment, lack of capacity, or serious or life-threatening 
disease and condition of the elderly individual.
107
  The theory here is that 
an elderly individual might be more inclined to participate in research 
about the condition from which he or she actually suffers.  For example, 
if the reason the elderly individual has impaired decision-making 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. § 24173(c)(9). 
 105. Id. § 24173(c)(11). 
 106. Id. 
 107. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24178(b) (West 2012). 
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capacity is because the individual has severe Alzheimer’s disease, then 
the theory is that the individual might be more inclined to participate in 
research relating to Alzheimer’s disease because she could both 
empathize with those who have the disease and wish to help others with 
the disease and because there is a possibility that she could directly 
benefit from the research.  On the other side, the California provision 
requiring alignment between the research participant’s own health 
condition and the topic of the research also prohibits a surrogate who is 
personally interested in, for example, dermatology or plastic surgery 
research, from enrolling an elderly individual with Alzheimer’s disease 
in such research when the research likely would not be in the individual’s 
interests. 
Unfortunately, it is possible even under the carefully drafted 
California Act for a surrogate to make a research participation decision 
that is not in accordance with the elderly individual’s preferences and 
values.  This can happen if the elderly individual did not express her 
wishes regarding research participation prior to her incompetency, in 
which case all the surrogate would have to do is claim that research 
participation would be in the elderly individual’s “best interests” and that 
participation would be what the individual would choose if capable of 
doing so.  For example, if a risky research protocol held out some 
prospect of direct medical benefit to the elderly individual, the surrogate 
might be able to assert that the prospect of direct medical benefit is in the 
individual’s “best interests” and that the elderly individual would have 
chosen to take on the risks associated with the research in exchange for 
the possible benefit.  This could occur even if the elderly individual, at 
heart, was a risk-averse or risk-neutral person and would have had an 
interest in avoiding any risk, even if such behavior meant losing out on a 
chance to benefit medically from the experiment.  Note that the 
California Act does not clarify who oversees a surrogate’s determination 
that research participation would be in the elderly individual’s best 
interests.  If it is the research team, which obviously has an interest in 
conducting the research and enrolling as many participants as possible, 
then further conflicts are introduced. 
Notwithstanding this flaw, which is the same flaw that exists in the 
detailed Pennsylvania Act governing conflicts of interest in clinical 
medicine, the California Act also does a good job of requiring 
information to be disclosed to surrogates to assist them in identifying 
potential conflicts.  For example, the California Act requires the 
surrogate to be notified during the informed consent process of the 
names of sponsors and funding sources, and of the researcher’s financial 
interests that exceed $10,000.  These provisions attempt to make the 
surrogate aware that the researcher has a financial interest in conducting 
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the research and that this financial interest may conflict with what would 
be in the elderly individual’s best interests.  Perhaps the California Act 
could go further by requiring this conflict to be expressly stated to the 
surrogate, for example:  “You should know that a researcher who 
receives material financial incentives in exchange for conducting 
research has an interest in conducting such research that may conflict 
with the best interests of the prospective human subject.” 
Like the Pennsylvania, Arizona, and Nevada Acts governing 
conflicts of interest in clinical medicine, the California Act establishes a 
priority-ordered list of persons who are eligible to serve as an elderly 
individual’s surrogate.  The list set forth in the California Act is perhaps 
superior to the lists discussed in the previous Part for a couple of reasons, 
including the fact that the California list requires the person selected to 
have “reasonable knowledge of the subject.”108  Although most children, 
parents, siblings, and grandchildren would have reasonable knowledge of 
the elderly individual for whom they are making a research participation 
decision, not all families are close-knit, and the California Act appears to 
be attempting to ensure that estranged relatives with interests that diverge 
from the elderly individual do not make conflicted decisions. 
In addition, note that the list set forth in the California Act places 
domestic partners immediately after spouses instead of at the bottom of 
the list after a number of other family members, including children, 
parents, siblings, and grandchildren.  Because an elderly individual could 
not legally have both a spouse and a domestic partner, this provision 
does result in an elderly individual who has a domestic partner with 
convergent interests being at the top of the list of persons who could 
serve as the individual’s surrogate.  Of course, domestic partners, just 
like spouses, can have interests that diverge from those of their legal 
partner, in which case the statutory scheme would produce conflicted 
decision making.  At least, however, the statute allows homosexual 
elderly individuals the same nondiscriminatory default—good or bad—
that heterosexual and married elderly individuals have.  To make the 
default completely nondiscriminatory, I would change the first class of 
persons on the list to “spouses or domestic partners” instead of having 
“spouses” listed first and “domestic partners” listed second. 
Again, the list is not perfect.  Any time a person in a higher class 
has interests that diverge from the elderly individual when a person in a 
lower class has interests that converge with the elderly individual, the 
statute could force conflicted decision making.  California is assuming 
that spouses and domestic partners are more likely to have convergent 
 
 108. Id. § 24178(c). 
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interests compared to children, parents, siblings, and grandchildren, and 
that may be true for many people, but it will not be true for all. 
In summary, the California Act does a good job of attempting to 
manage conflicts of interest in the context of surrogate research 
participation decision making, but does not remove the possibility of 
conflicted decision making entirely. 
2. Virginia 
Under Virginia’s Human Research Act (“Virginia Act”),109 consent 
to research participation generally must be obtained from the elderly 
individual who will be participating in such research.
110
  However, if the 
elderly individual is incapable of making an informed decision regarding 
research participation, the Virginia Act does allow a legally authorized 
representative (LAR) to consent to research participation on behalf of the 
elderly individual.
111
  In the context of elderly individuals who do not 
have an agent under a medical power of attorney and for whom a 
guardian has not been appointed, the Virginia Act allows the following 
priority-ordered list of persons to serve as LARs:  (i) the spouse of the 
individual, except where a suit for divorce has been filed and the divorce 
decree is not yet final; (ii) an adult child of the individual; (iii) a parent 
of the individual; (iv) an adult brother or sister of the individual; or (v) 
any person or judicial or other body authorized by law or regulation to 
consent on behalf of a prospective subject to such subject’s participation 
in the particular human research.
112
 
The Virginia Act does an excellent job of recognizing the 
possibility that the LAR and elderly individual might have conflicting 
interests regarding research participation.  For example, the Virginia Act 
clarifies that “[n]o official or employee of the institution or agency 
conducting or authorizing the research shall be qualified to act as a[n] 
[LAR],”113 which is an attempt to ensure that the financial and other 
benefits to the institution of conducting research do not influence the 
elderly individual’s research participation.  The Virginia Act also 
clarifies that, “[n]otwithstanding consent by a[n] [LAR], no person shall 
be forced to participate in human subjects research if the investigator 
conducting the research knows that the participation in the research is 
 
 109. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-162.16–32.1-162.20 (2013). 
 110. Id. § 32.1-162.18(A)(i). 
 111. See id. § 32.1-162.18(A)(ii). 
 112. Id. § 32.1-162.16 (referring to definition of “legally authorized representative,” 
criteria (iii)-(viii)). 
 113. Id. (referring to the definition of “legally authorized representative”). 
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protested by the prospective subject”114  Moreover, the Virginia Act 
prohibits an LAR from consenting to research participation if the “[LAR] 
knows, or upon reasonable inquiry ought to know, that any aspect of the 
research is contrary to the religious beliefs or basic values of the 
prospective subject, whether expressed orally or in writing.”115  Finally, 
the Virginia Act prohibits an LAR from consenting to research on behalf 
of an elderly individual if the research would involve nontherapeutic 
sterilization, abortion, psychosurgery, or admission for research purposes 
to certain hospitals and other health care facilities.
116
  Although 
sterilization and abortion might not be entirely relevant in the context of 
elderly individuals, psychosurgery and inpatient admissions certainly 
could be. 
The Virginia Act also recognizes that the LAR and the elderly 
individual could have divergent views regarding the level of acceptable 
research-related risk.  To this end, the Virginia Act prohibits an LAR 
from consenting to nontherapeutic research on behalf of the elderly 
individual unless a human research committee determines that such 
nontherapeutic research will present no more than a minor increase over 
minimal risk to the elderly individual.
117
 
The Virginia Act, although less detailed than the California Act, 
does a nice job of attempting to recognize some of the most important 
conflicts of interest between research institutions and surrogates on the 
one hand, and prospective human subjects who lack capacity on the 
other.  As discussed above, the Virginia Act recognizes four different 
situations in which the LAR and the elderly individual might have 
divergent views regarding research participation, including when the 
research institution itself wants to be an LAR; when the individual is 
protesting research participation; when the research is contrary to the 
individual’s known religious views; and when the research involves 
controversial interventions such as psychosurgery and inpatient 
psychiatric hospital admission.  The Virginia Act also does an excellent 
job of identifying the concern associated with risk-seeking LARs 
attempting to enroll elderly individuals in risky, nontherapeutic research, 
 
 114. Id. § 32.1-162.18(A).  The Virginia Act clarifies: 
In the case of persons suffering from organic brain diseases causing progressive 
deterioration of cognition for which there is no known cure or medically 
accepted treatment, the implementation of experimental courses of therapeutic 
treatment to which a legally authorized representative has given informed 
consent shall not constitute the use of force. 
Id. 
 115. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.18(B) (2013). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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and essentially prohibits LAR consent in such situations, unless the 
research presents only a minor increase over minimal risk. 
The Virginia Act could be critiqued on the usual grounds.  That is, 
(i) the Virginia Act’s priority-ordered list of persons who may serve as a 
surrogate will not always ensure that the person who is highest on the list 
has interests that are convergent with those of the elderly individual; (ii) 
the Virginia Act’s priority-ordered list does not include some persons, 
such as domestic partners, whose interests may converge with the elderly 
individual’s interests; and (iii) because surrogacy legislation is always 
less preferential than advanced health care and research participation 
planning, the Virginia Act leaves the door open for unscrupulous LARs 
to consent to research that is not in the best interests of elderly 
individuals who cannot protect themselves due to impaired decision-
making capacity. 
3. Nevada 
Many states do not have any laws that thoroughly govern the 
conduct of human subject research, including laws that thoroughly 
address whether and how a surrogate may consent to research 
participation on behalf of an elderly individual with impaired decision-
making capacity when advanced research planning has not taken place 
and a guardian has not been appointed for the individual.
118
  Nevada, for 
example, has one extremely short provision that simply prohibits a 
physician from “performing, without first obtaining the informed consent 
of the patient or the patient’s family, any procedure or prescribing any 
therapy which by the current standards of the practice of medicine is 
experimental.”119  Of note, the provision would appear to allow any 
family member to consent to research participation on behalf of an 
elderly individual with impaired decision-making capacity when 
advanced research planning has not taken place and if the individual does 
not otherwise have a guardian, regardless of whether the family member 
has interests that conflict with those of the elderly individual.  Of course, 
given the ethical and legal consequences of such consent, it would be 
unwise for an attorney to rely on such a short statutory provision, which 
 
 118. See, e.g., SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE SUBCOMMITTEE. FOR THE 
INCLUSION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH IMPAIRED DECISION MAKING IN RESEARCH (SIIIDR) 
(2009) [hereinafter SIIIDR RECOMMENDATIONS] (“Very few states specifically define 
legally authorized representatives (LARs) for research, and most state’s laws are silent on 
the topic.  Virtually no state laws address the many ethical issues that arise when LARs 
are involved in research decision-making, leaving it to IRBs and institutions to invent 
solutions.”). 
 119. NEV. REV. STAT. § 630.306(6) (2012). 
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suggests a lack of knowledge by the Nevada Legislature regarding the 
complex ethical and legal issues associated with human subject research. 
As discussed elsewhere, in states that lack research-specific laws, 
like Nevada, some researchers and research institutions rely on state laws 
that govern consent to treatment,
120
 including laws like the Pennsylvania 
Act, the Arizona Act, and the Nevada Act discussed earlier in this article.  
Moreover, it is the current policy of the federal Office of Human 
Research Protections (OHRP) to permit a surrogate to consent to 
research if the surrogate is authorized under state law to consent to the 
“procedures involved in the research” under state laws governing consent 
to treatment.
121
  In addition, a federal Subcommittee for the Inclusion of 
Individuals with Impaired Decision Making in Research (SIIIDR) 
currently recommends, in the absence of a specific state law governing 
consent to research, that a surrogate who is designated to make non-
research health care decisions be ranked second in the priority-ordered 
list of persons who are eligible to make research participation 
decisions.
122
  Elsewhere, I argued that legislation governing consent to 
treatment should not be used to answer research-related questions due to 
the inability of research subjects, surrogates, and sometimes even 
researchers to distinguish between the concepts of treatment and 
research, resulting in a problem known as “therapeutic misconception,” 
and, more generally, the conflicts of interest that are inherent in human 
subject research.  I incorporate those arguments herein.  That is, I 
critique states such as Nevada that fail to have proper legislation 
governing surrogate consent to research participation because I believe 
the lack of such legislation opens the door for elderly individuals with 
impaired decision-making capacity to be the subjects of conflicted and 
dangerous decision making.
123
 
 
 120. See, e.g., Tovino, supra note 2, Part I; see also OFFICE OF EXTRAMURAL 
RESEARCH, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, RESEARCH INVOLVING INDIVIDUALS WITH 
QUESTIONABLE CAPACITY TO CONSENT: POINTS TO CONSIDER (Nov. 2009), available at 
http://1.usa.gov/X4GvWt (“In most jurisdictions, LAR [legally authorized representative] 
appointment processes are not specific to the research setting and institutions rely on the 
laws governing the use of LARs for clinical care.”). 
 121. See, e.g., SIIIDR RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 118, at 8(b) (explaining that, 
“[i]n states with laws or regulations that address consent to treatment but do not 
specifically consider consent to research, current OHRP [Office for Human Research 
Protections] interpretation permits consent to research by individuals authorized under 
laws that allow consent to the ‘procedures involved in the research.’”). 
 122. See id. at 9(a)(ii)(b) (recommending, in the absence of applicable state law, that a 
person who is designated to make non-research health care decisions be ranked second in 
the priority-ordered list of persons who are eligible to make research participation 
decisions). 
 123. See Tovino, supra note 2, Part IV. 
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III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
This final Part compares and contrasts approaches taken by state 
rules of professional conduct for managing conflicts of interest in the 
context of legal representation and compares these approaches to the 
approaches used in clinical medicine and human subject research.  One 
purpose of these comparisons is to identify options for managing 
conflicts in different professional settings, including clinical medicine, 
human subjects research, and law, and to determine whether one 
professional setting’s approach is superior to another. 
A. Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (“Model Rules”) strictly govern conflicts of interest between 
attorneys and clients, including elderly clients with impaired decision-
making capacity.
124
  As explained previously in this symposium issue, 
the general Model Rule is that an attorney is prohibited from 
representing a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict 
of interest.
125
  Under the Model Rules, a concurrent conflict of interest 
exists if the representation of one client will be directly adverse to 
another client or if there is a significant risk that the representation of one 
or more clients will be materially limited by the attorney’s 
responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person, or by 
a personal interest of the attorney.
126
  For example, an attorney generally 
could not represent both an elderly individual with impaired decision-
making capacity and the elderly individual’s estranged son who is 
contesting the elderly individual’s will because he was not included in it. 
Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest, 
the Model Rules do allow an attorney to represent a client if the 
following criteria are satisfied:  (i) the attorney reasonably believes that 
he or she will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to 
each affected client; (ii) the representation is not prohibited by law; (iii) 
the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client 
against another client represented by the attorney in the same litigation or 
other proceeding before a tribunal; and (iv) each affected client gives 
informed consent, confirmed in writing.
127
 
 
 124. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2012), available at http://bit.ly/dPaBGm. 
 125. Id. R. 1.7(a). 
 126. Id. R. 1.7(a)(1)-(2). 
 127. Id. R. 1.7(b)(1)-(4). 
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In addition to these general rules, and as explained previously in 
this symposium issue, the Model Rules also provide specific guidance 
for particular situations in which conflicts are especially likely.  For 
example, the Model Rules prohibit an attorney from entering into a 
business transaction with a client or knowingly acquiring an ownership, 
possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client 
unless:  (i) the transaction and terms on which the attorney acquires the 
interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and 
transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by 
the client; (ii) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of 
seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of 
independent legal counsel on the transaction; and (iii) the client gives 
informed consent, in writing, to the essential terms of the transaction and 
the attorney’s role in the transaction, including whether the attorney is 
representing the client in the transaction.
128
 
By further example, the Model Rules prohibit an attorney from 
soliciting any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, 
or preparing on behalf of a client an instrument giving the attorney or a 
person related to the attorney any substantial gift unless the attorney or 
other recipient of the gift is related to the client.
129
  This rule would of 
course prohibit an attorney who is representing an elderly client with 
impaired decision-making capacity and who is not related by blood to 
such client from preparing a will for the client that gives to the attorney 
substantial money or property upon the client’s death. 
By still further example, the Model Rules prohibit an attorney from 
accepting compensation for representing a client from one other than the 
client unless:  (i) the client gives informed consent; (ii) there is no 
interference with the attorney’s independence of professional judgment 
or with the client-attorney relationship; and (iii) information relating to 
representation of a client is protected as required under Model Rule 
provisions relating to confidential client communications.
130
  This rule, 
of course, would prohibit an attorney who is representing an elderly 
client with impaired decision-making capacity from accepting payment 
for the legal services provided to the elderly client from the client’s 
estranged son, who is seeking to be added to the client’s will. 
Note that the Model Rules take a different approach to conflicts in 
legal representation than the state laws discussed in Parts I and II of this 
article take in regards to conflicts in clinical medicine and human subject 
research.  That is, the default in the practice of law is that an attorney 
 
 128. Id. R. 1.8(a)(1)-(3). 
 129. Id. R. 1.8(c). 
 130. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f) (2012). 
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cannot take on a representation when there is a conflict of interest, unless 
several criteria, including client consent, have been satisfied.  With few 
exceptions, the default in clinical medicine and human subject research, 
on the other hand, is that a surrogate can consent to the administration, 
withholding, or withdrawal of treatment and research participation as 
long as the surrogate has considered the individual’s preferences and 
values and believes that the surrogate’s decision is in accordance with 
those preferences and values.  Stated slightly differently, the default in 
law is that the activity, i.e., legal representation, cannot take place when 
a conflict exists, whereas the default in medicine and research is that the 
activity, i.e., consent to treatment or research, can take place because it is 
assumed that a conflict of interest does not exist, absent the existence of 
a limiting factor, such as an advanced health care or research planning 
document or other express statement that the individual did not want to 
do what the surrogate is contemplating doing.  Stated yet a third way, the 
law governing conflicts of interest in the context of legal representation, 
at least as set forth in the Model Rules, appears to be more stringent than 
the illustrative state laws examined in Parts I and II that govern conflicts 
of interest in clinical medicine and human subjects research. 
B. State Law 
Although most state rules of professional conduct relating to 
conflicts of interest are modeled (with some changes) after the Model 
Rule provisions governing conflicts of interest, three sets of state rules 
will be quickly examined for the purpose of completeness. 
1. Texas 
The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (“Texas 
Rules”) are similar to, but more stringent and detailed, and organized 
slightly differently, than the Model Rules with respect to the topic of 
conflicts of interest.  Under the Texas Rules, the general rule is that an 
attorney shall not represent opposing parties to the same litigation
131
 and 
that an attorney shall not represent a person if the representation of that 
person:  (i) involves a substantially related matter in which that person’s 
interests are materially and directly adverse to the interests of another 
client of the attorney or the attorney’s firm; or (ii) reasonably appears to 
be or become adversely limited by the attorney’s or law firm’s 
responsibilities to another client or to a third person or by the attorney’s 
 
 131. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06(a) (2012), available at 
http://bit.ly/UpovTq. 
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or law firm’s own interests.132  However, the Texas Rules permit an 
attorney to represent a client in the circumstances described in the second 
clause of the preceding sentence if:  (i) the attorney reasonably believes 
the representation of each client will not be materially affected; and (ii) 
each affected or potentially affected client consents to such 
representation after full disclosure of the existence, nature, implications, 
and possible adverse consequences of the common representation and the 
advantages involved, if any.
133
 
Like the Model Rules, the Texas Rules also contain specific 
provisions governing particular situations that are likely to give rise to 
conflicts of interest, including situations involving attorneys who wish to 
act as intermediaries between clients,
134
 attorneys who wish to enter into 
business transactions with clients,
135
 and attorneys who wish to represent 
new clients in matters adverse to previous clients.
136
 
2. New Jersey 
The New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct (“New Jersey 
Rules”) are almost identical to the Model Rules governing conflicts of 
interest with just a few technical changes.  That is, the New Jersey Rules 
generally prohibit an attorney from representing a client if the 
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.
137
  Under the 
New Jersey Rules, a concurrent conflict of interest exists if:  (i) the 
representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or 
(ii) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more 
clients will be materially limited by the attorney’s responsibilities to 
another client, a former client, or a third person, or by a personal interest 
of the attorney.
138
  Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict 
of interest, the New Jersey Rules allow an attorney to represent a client 
if:  (i) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, 
after full disclosure and consultation; (ii) the attorney reasonably 
believes that he or she will be able to provide competent and diligent 
representation to each affected client; (iii) the representation is not 
prohibited by law; and (iv) the representation does not involve the 
assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by 
 
 132. Id. R. 1.06(b)(1)-(2). 
 133. Id. R. 1.06(c)(1)-(2). 
 134. Id. R. 1.07. 
 135. Id. R. 1.08. 
 136. Id. R. 1.09. 
 137. See N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2012), available at 
http://bit.ly/ZuhUXw. 
 138. Id. R. 1.7(a)(1)-(2). 
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the attorney in the same litigation or other proceeding before a 
tribunal.
139
 
Like the Model Rules, the New Jersey Rules contain specific rules 
governing particular situations in which conflicts are particularly likely 
to arise, including, for example, situations in which attorneys are 
considering entering into business transactions with clients; situations in 
which attorneys are considering preparing, on behalf of a client, an 
instrument giving the attorney a substantial gift; and situations in which 
attorneys are considering accepting compensation for representing a 
client from a person other than the client.
140
 
3. Nevada 
The Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct (“Nevada Rules”) are 
also almost identical to the Model Rules and the New Jersey Rules 
governing conflicts of interest with just a few technical changes.  That is, 
the Nevada Rules generally prohibit an attorney from representing a 
client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.
141
 
Under the Nevada Rules, a concurrent conflict of interest exists if:  
(i) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another 
client; or (ii) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or 
more clients will be materially limited by the attorney’s responsibilities 
to another client, a former client, or a third person, or by a personal 
interest of the attorney.
142
  Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent 
conflict of interest, however, the Nevada Rules, similarly to the Model 
Rules, permit an attorney to represent a client if:  (i) the attorney 
reasonably believes that he or she will be able to provide competent and 
diligent representation to each affected client; (ii) the representation is 
not prohibited by law; (iii) the representation does not involve the 
assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by 
the attorney in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; 
and (iv) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in 
writing.
143
  The Nevada Rules also contain specific rules governing 
particular situations in which conflicts are particularly likely to arise 
including, for example, situations in which attorneys are considering 
entering into business transactions with clients; situations in which 
attorneys are considering preparing, on behalf of a client, an instrument 
 
 139. Id. R. 1.7(b)(1)-(4). 
 140. Id. R. 1.8(a), (c), (f). 
 141. See NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2012), available at 
http://bit.ly/114SWmu. 
 142. Id. R. 1.7(a)(1)-(2). 
 143. Id. R. 1.7(b)(1)-(4). 
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giving the attorney a substantial gift; and situations in which attorneys 
are considering accepting compensation for representing a client from a 
person other than the client.
144
 
IV. CONCLUSION:  CONFLICTS IN MEDICINE, RESEARCH, AND LAW 
COMPARED 
This final Part compares and contrasts the approaches taken by 
illustrative state laws in identifying and managing conflicts of interest in 
the context of legal representation to illustrative state laws in the contexts 
of clinical medicine and human subject research.  One purpose of these 
comparisons is to identify options for managing conflicts in different 
professional settings and to determine whether one professional setting’s 
approach is superior to another. 
As discussed in more detail below, this Part finds that the law 
imposes more stringent duties relating to the identification and 
management of conflicts of interest in the context of legal representation 
compared to the contexts of clinical medicine and human subjects 
research. 
Let us begin by examining whether state laws in each professional 
context actually recognize and explicitly refer to the concept of “conflict 
of interest.”  The three state laws discussed in Part III addressing legal 
representation all recognize that attorneys may have interests that 
conflict with their clients.  Each state law has a separate rule or rules 
(i.e., Texas Rules 1.07, 1.08, and 1.09; New Jersey Rules 1.7 and 1.8; 
and Nevada Rules 1.7 and 1.8) governing conflicts of interest that 
identifies the concept of a conflict of interest, that defines the activities 
and relationships that constitute a conflict of interest, and that generally 
prohibits an attorney from taking on any representation when a conflict 
of interest exists.  On the other hand, the state laws discussed in Parts I 
and II relating to clinical medicine and human subject research do not do 
this.  Without using the language of “conflict of interest,” a few of the 
state laws discussed in Parts I and II, including the Pennsylvania Act, the 
Arizona Act, the California Act, and the Virginia Act, implicitly 
recognize that certain individuals may have a financial or other interest 
that diverges from those of the patient or human subject.  However, note 
that even the comprehensive Pennsylvania Act, Arizona Act, California 
Act, and Virginia Act do not use the language of “conflict of interest.”  
These state laws do not have separate provisions identifying, defining, 
listing, or describing the possible conflicts of interest.  Instead, they 
simply (and quietly) identify a few situations in which certain classes of 
 
 144. Id. R. 1.8(a), (c), (f). 
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persons cannot serve as another individual’s surrogate.  The trained 
health law professor or health care attorney will recognize the statutes for 
what they are:  an understated attempt to limit conflicted surrogate 
decision making.  To the untrained eye, however, the statutes do not 
specifically recognize, highlight, or otherwise make the reader aware that 
the relationships between and among physicians and investigators, 
surrogates, and patients and human subjects are fraught with potential 
conflicts of interest. 
Second, with the exception of the California Act discussed in Part 
II, which does require disclosure by the researcher to the surrogate of 
certain financial interests (although these are not labeled conflicts of 
interest), note that the illustrative state laws discussed in Parts I and II do 
not require express disclosure and waiver of conflicts of interest.  For 
example, the Virginia Act does not require a prospective human subject 
or a surrogate to be given a document that contains a section called 
“Conflicts of Interest” that identifies or lists all of the situations in which 
a researcher or research institution might have interests that diverge from 
those of the elderly individual whose research participation is being 
encouraged.  Without such a disclosure, an unsophisticated human 
subject and/or surrogate might not make the connection between the 
receipt of financial compensation by a researcher from a pharmaceutical 
company and the creation of an incentive on the part of that researcher to 
enroll human subjects into the research sponsored by the pharmaceutical 
company, even though such research might not be in the subject’s best 
health interests. 
Third, note that the illustrative state laws discussed in Parts I and II 
of this article take a different approach to the management of conflicts of 
interest.  That is, the default in the practice of law is that an attorney 
cannot take on a representation when there is a conflict of interest, unless 
several criteria, including labeling and disclosure of the interest as a 
“conflict of interest” and client consent to the conflict of interest, 
confirmed in writing, have been satisfied.  With few exceptions, the 
default in clinical medicine and human subject research, on the other 
hand, is that a surrogate can consent to the administration, withholding, 
or withdrawal of treatment and research participation as long as the 
surrogate has considered the individual’s preferences and values and 
believes that the surrogate’s decision is in accordance with those 
preferences and values.  Stated slightly differently, the default in law is 
that the activity, i.e., legal representation, cannot take place when a 
conflict exists, whereas the default in medicine and research is that the 
activity, i.e., consent to treatment or research, can take place because it is 
assumed that a conflict of interest does not exist unless there is an 
advanced health care or research planning document or other express 
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statement that the individual did not want to do what the surrogate is 
considering doing. 
Finally, note that the conflicts of interest that can arise due to the 
lack of advanced health care and research participation planning in the 
contexts of clinical medicine and human subjects research are as 
substantively concerning, if not more so, than the conflicts of interest 
that arise during the provision of estate planning, retirement planning, 
and long-term care planning.  Elsewhere in this symposium, an author 
has expressed concern that Social Security benefits may be paid to a 
representative whose interests diverge from the interests of the actual 
Society Security beneficiary.
145
  A second author has expressed concern 
that, when elderly parents enter into marriages that are unprotected by 
law, conflicted distributions may be made.
146
  Concerns relating to 
inappropriate Social Security payments and unintended distributions are 
no laughing matter.  However, concerns relating to the inappropriate 
withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment, or consent to a 
risky medical experiment, which may result in serious injury or death, 
are at least equally concerning. 
For these reasons, this article joins the already robust law review 
and other literatures that urge advanced health care and advanced 
research participation planning to minimize conflicts of interest that 
could arise when a surrogate, in the absence of a formally appointed 
agent or guardian, would like to consent to the administration, 
withholding, or withdrawal of treatment or consent to research 
participation on behalf of an elderly individual with impaired decision-
making capacity.  As such, this article hopefully serves as a nice 
capstone to the other pieces in this symposium by providing yet another 
reminder that legal planning, even with the conflicts of interest identified 
by the other authors in this symposium, is almost always superior to the 
lack of planning. 
This article also, however, proposes a novel solution for health care 
and research-related conflicts:  state laws governing conflicts of interest 
in clinical medicine and human subject research should consider 
borrowing approaches to conflicts management that are set forth in state 
rules of attorney professional conduct.  Such approaches include, but are 
not limited to, the establishment of:  (i) special statutory provisions 
specifically governing “conflicts of interest,”  much like those set forth in 
 
 145.  See Reid K. Weisbord, Social Security Representative Payee Misuse, 117 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 1257 (2013). 
 146.  See Lynne Marie Kohm, Why Marriage Is Still the Best Default in Estate 
Planning Conflicts, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1219 (2013).  For a discussion of the other 
articles in this symposium issue, see Pearson, supra note 1. 
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Texas Rules 1.07, 1.08, and 1.09; New Jersey Rules 1.7 and 1.8; and 
Nevada Rules 1.7 and 1.8; (ii) content within such statutory provisions 
that requires identification and description of the types of conflicts of 
interest that can arise in clinical medicine and human subjects research; 
(iii) content within such statutory provisions that explains in lay 
terminology why such conflicts of interest can be harmful to the health 
(including death, serious injury, and illness) and other interests of the 
patient or human subject; and (iv) content within such statutory 
provisions that requires disclosure and waiver of such conflicts, as 
appropriate. 
 
